A Perfect
Storm: The Disappearance of Flight 19
by Brian Schill
It was a mere three months after World War II ended, the U.S. still reveling in
final victory over the Axis powers when five TBM Avenger torpedo bombers
departed from the Fort Lauderdale / Hollywood (Florida) Naval Air Station on 5
December 1945. The five TBM Avengers and their crew were on a training mission
titled “Naval Air Station, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Navigation Problem No. 1”
which would have the Avenger squadron negotiating a triangular course beginning
at and returning to Fort Lauderdale NAS. The course, a basic one by any
standard, would take the squadron almost due east on a bearing of 092 degrees
for 56 miles (90 km) until reaching Hens and Chickens Shoals, where low-level
practice bombing runs were planned. When the bombing runs were completed, the
flight was to continue east for another 67 miles (108 km) before turning onto a
course bearing of 346 degrees for 73 miles (117 km), flying over Grand Bahama
Island in the process. Finally, the last turn for Flight 19 would be a course
bearing of 241 degrees for 120 miles (193 km), bringing it back to Ft.
Lauderdale NAS. This flight plan would bring the squadron directly through the
westernmost tip of the Bermuda Triangle.
Your Pre-flight Briefing
Introduced into service in 1942 the TBM Avenger had a wingspan of 54 feet and a
Wright Cyclone R-2600 engine that had an output of 1,600 horsepower which gave
the aircraft a top speed of nearly 300 miles per hour at a range of 1,000 miles.
Each Avenger carried a three-man crew: pilot, gunner and radioman and had
typical armament consisting of one standard torpedo or a 2,000-pound bomb and
two .50-caliber machine guns – one mounted under the forward cowl and another in
a power-operated ball turret behind the cockpit. It was this combination of
speed and firepower during the final days of World War II that was used to full
effect on the Japanese naval fleet, sinking the battleship Yamato, her escort of
four destroyers and the cruiser Yahagi – and, in the process, earning the
Avenger a well deserved a reputation as one of the most reliable and deadly
torpedo bombers in the skies.
The TBM Avenger aircraft being used for Navigation Problem No. 1 at Ft.
Lauderdale NAS in 1945 were essentially the same as their predecessors, both
structurally and mechanically. This was a proven aircraft design that excelled
on a number of platforms during times of peace and during times of war. Each
plane was prepped, being fueled and preflight inspections were taking place when
it was discovered that none of the aircraft that were to engage in the training
mission had clocks in their cockpit. This, however, was not a concern as each
man had a watch and the entire purpose of this particular training mission,
Navigation Problem No. 1, was to teach the pilots the principles of “dead
reckoning,” the ability to calculate in-flight elapsed time for course
coordination.
Systems Check: Disaster, Go!
The men were in pre-flight prep when Allen Kosner decided not to go on the
mission – he already logged his required monthly flight time and opted for some
R&R. The other thirteen men continued their pre-flight prep – four of the pilots
were being observed by an instructor who would be joining them on the flight
while the nine enlisted men were taking advanced combat aircrew training. Flight
time was scheduled at 1345 hours but, at 1310 hours the officers and enlisted
men of Flight 19 were still in the Operations Building awaiting arrival of their
instructor. This, it would seem, was a beginning – a shadowy portent of problems
to come. At 1315 hours their instructor, Lieutenant Charles C. Taylor, arrived
at the briefing room but instead of offering an apology for his untimely arrival
he asked the Duty Officer that he be relieved of his command for Flight 19. He
gave no reason, he simply stated: “I just don’t want to take this one out.” The
Duty Officer, however, would not hear of it as there were no other qualified
instructors available at the time.
Lieutenant Taylor, a Texas A&M University graduate and a six-year Navy veteran
with more than 2,000 hours in his flight logbook also had 10 months of combat
flight experience in the South Pacific. As he dutifully began analyzing weather
charts and the winds aloft he noted that between 3,000 and 4,000 feet Flight 19
could expect to find scattered clouds with a visibility range of 8 to 10 miles
and, around 4 p.m. they could expect scattered rain showers. These weather
conditions were not unusual for the region and would be nothing new to the
students, each of whom had 300+ hours of flight time in their logbooks. After
the briefing Lieutenant Taylor read off the flight assignments:
FT-3: Ensign Joseph T. Bossi, Herman A. Thelander, Burt E. Baluk
FT 28: Lieutenant Charles C. Taylor, Walter R. Parpart, George F. Devlin
FT-36: Captain Edward J. Powers, Jr., Howell O. Thompson, George R. Paonessa
FT-81: Second Lieutenant Forrest J. Gerber, William E. Lightfoot
FT-117: Captain George W. Stivers, Robert F. Gallivan, Robert F. Gruebel
After receiving their assignments the men headed off to their respective
aircraft and, at 1410 hours, Lieutenant Taylor and his squadron were airborne
and in formation headed for Hens and Chickens Shoals, about 22 miles north of
Bimini in the Bahamas. It only took about 20 minutes for the squadron to reach
the first destination of their flight and, by 1430; the pilots began the
commencement of low-level bombing runs on an old concrete bunker. By 1500 hours
the squadron had finished up their practice bombing runs and, with their initial
objective completed, Flight 19 set their bearing back at 092 degrees to complete
the first leg of the flight plan. With Hens and Chickens Shoals “on their six ”
the aircraft were observed in flight, heading east, by a fishing boat skipper –
he would be the last person to ever see Flight 19.
Into A Tailspin
Around 1540 hours Lieutenant Robert F. “Bob” Cox was commanding a training
mission over Fort Lauderdale in another squadron of Avengers when he heard a
weak signal that he thought was from a boat or plane that may have been in
distress. The signal was on the 4,805 kilocycle frequency and the voice was
addressing someone named Powers. The speaker provided no identification, but
repeatedly asked “Powers” about the readings on his compasses – then added “We
must have got lost after that last turn.” Upon hearing this Cox radioed Flight
Operations at Fort Lauderdale NAS and relayed the information to them. The tower
acknowledged Cox’s information and alerted Air Sea Rescue Task Unit 4 at Port
Everglades. Lieutenant Cox then attempted to find out who was in distress and
where they were at. “This is FT-74 – plane or boat calling Powers please
identify yourself so someone can assist.” The radio was silent.
At 1605 hours Rolland J. Koch, a radioman at Fort Lauderdale’s control tower,
picked up on what is believed to be Lieutenant Taylor’s radio signal. Koch tried
to contact Taylor, but with no success. Around the same time Lieutenant Cox
attempted to contact Taylor a second time. “This is FT-74 – What is your
trouble? Over.” Cox radioed, and again he was met with silence. After 16 minutes
of radio silence the speaker gave way and crackled to life – “This is FT-28…
both of my compasses are out. I’m trying to find Fort Lauderdale. I’m over land,
but it’s broken. I’m sure I’m in the Keys, but I don’t know how far down.”
It would be highly unusual for both compasses in the aircraft to be inoperable
but what concerned Lieutenant Cox even more was the nervous tone in Taylor’s
voice. He was a seasoned pilot and a combat veteran – what could have him so
shaken? Cox radioed back: “If you are in the Keys put the sun to your port
[left] wing and fly up the coast until you get to Miami. Fort Lauderdale is 20
miles farther. What is your position? I’ll fly south and meet you.” At that
Taylor responded: “I know where I am now. I’m at 2,300 feet. Don’t come after
me.” A somewhat inappropriate response, not a location but an altitude.
Lieutenant Cox responded to Taylor: “You’re at 2,300 feet. I’m coming to meet
you anyhow.” Taylor called back: “We have just passed over a small island. We
have no other land in sight.” If Flight 19 has been near the Florida Keys as
Taylor believed, he should have been able to see the other islands in the Keys
as well as the Florida peninsula. Taylor radioed Cox again: “Can you have Miami
or someone turn on their radar and pick us up? We don’t seem to be getting far.
We were out on a navigation hop, and on the second leg I thought they [the
student pilots] were going wrong. I took over and was flying them back to the
right position. But I’m sure that neither one of my compasses is working.” Cox
alerted Ft. Lauderdale NAS to the situation and asked that other radar stations
and merchant vessels in the area stay alert for the aircraft.
Cox had a sinking feeling. A seasoned pilot and a combat veteran, seemingly
disoriented with equipment malfunctioning – and – who is not following any of
the prescribed protocol for emergency procedure: In case of disorientation, a
pilot was supposed to turn on the IFF, climb for altitude and try to pick up the
homing transmitter from the air station. He would then tune his radio to 3,000
kilocycles, an unimpeded channel to be used in case of emergency only. If he was
over water he was supposed to fly toward the west; if he was over land, he was
to fly east. “Turn on your emergency IFF gear, or do you have it on already?
Also, try your ZBX homing receiver.” Cox radioed. Taylor responded that he did
not have the IFF switched on, nor was he utilizing his homing beacon. Then, the
radio fell ominously silent again.
At 1630, nearly 20 minutes after the last radio contact the silence was again
broken, but this time it was Captain Stivers in FT-117: “We are not sure where
we are. We think we must be approximately 225 miles east of base. It looks like
we are entering white water.” After a few seconds of silence an unknown pilot
from flight 19 radioed: “We’re completely lost.” Upon hearing the transmission
Cox attempted to respond. He radioed Taylor again but received no reply. He
could hear Taylor and the men in his squadron, but, it was as if they could not
hear him. The matter was now compounded as Cox began having electrical problems
of his own. A relay in his radio burned out – he was no longer able to
communicate with anyone. Cox tried all frequencies but heard only silence as he
banked his plane toward the air station.
After landing back at Ft. Lauderdale NAS Cox reported to the Duty Officer,
Lieutenant Commander Don Poole: “I know where the planes are. I’d like to take
the ready-plane out and lead them back to base.” Lieutenant Poole would not
allow it, he told Cox to wait. He was expecting a position fix on the TBMs.
Unfortunately, the position fix was delayed, and neither Cox nor the ready-plane
ever left the ground. Finally, at 1750 hours the network of radar stations along
the Florida coast was able to obtain a reliable single-bearing fix on Flight 19.
The problem with this single-bearing fix was that two bearings were needed to
triangulate the Avengers position. To remedy this, two PBM Mariner seaplanes
were sent to the most probable area where Flight 19 might have been found so
that they could create the second bearing point.
Fate Will Not Be Denied
Tragedy would not leave the mission, or anything attached to it, undisturbed. At
1927 hours, 23 minutes after takeoff, PBM-5 (Bu. No. 59225) exploded and crashed
into the sea, killing all 13 men aboard. Merchant seamen aboard the oil tanker
Gaines Mill witnessed explosion and confirmation of the incident came from radar
operators aboard the aircraft carrier USS Solomons. With clouded darkness on a
moonless night, rough seas and high winds working against them crews from both
vessels set to work looking for survivors but found only twisted debris afloat
in the dark waters.
Just after 2000 hours the air traffic control tower at Opa Locka, FL. received a
faint transmission that they believed to be Taylor: “All planes, close up tight.
Will have to ditch unless landfall. When the first plane drops to 10 gallons, we
all go down together. FT…FT….” As Taylor’s words echoed within the walls of the
tower silence again fell. These would be the last words anyone would ever hear
from Taylor or the men of Flight 19. At 2015 hours rescue boats patrolling the
waters off of Miami contacted Port Everglades and stated that they had been
unable to radio any of the aircraft from Flight 19. Officials at Port Everglades
told the patrol boat to put in and secure for the night – it was estimated by
the command at Ft. Lauderdale NAS that Flight 19 would have fuel reserves to
keep them aloft until around 2000 hours but, after that, well, the worst was to
be assumed.
Search and Recovery Efforts
The next morning a massive search effort was launched in an attempt to locate
any survivors from Flight 19. Those in command of the search and rescue
operations based their search on the single bearing direction-finding fix from
the night before as well as the maximum distance the planes could have flown
before they ran out of fuel. Search and rescue operations continued for three
days and included the whole state of Florida, most of Georgia, the Florida Keys
and parts of the Gulf of Mexico. Overall, more than 250,000 square miles of
land, the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico were searched, but no trace of
Flight 19 was found. After the third day the search and rescue mission turned
into a search and recovery mission in hopes that the bodies of the men may be
recovered and that they may be properly laid to rest. Closure, however, was not
to come.
Within days, federal military investigation proceedings stemming from the
disappearance of Flight 19 were undertaken. A committee was appointed by then
Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal and a board of inquiry commenced with
investigation operations opening in Miami on December 10, 1945. The Flight 19
incident was one of the most unusual enigmas that any of the investigators had
ever faced. It seemed almost inconceivable that a highly experienced aviation
instructor such as Lt. Charles Taylor could become so disoriented in his general
position that he was unable to reorient himself and lead his flight back to Fort
Lauderdale. After the conclusion of the investigation the board of inquiry
“officially” concluded that the five TBM Avenger aircraft and all naval
personnel aboard disappeared as a result of causes or reasons unknown after
having taken off on a routine navigational flight out of Fort Lauderdale on 5
December 1945.
Observances in the Aftermath
In the nearly 67 years since the Flight 19 incident both military and civilian
researchers have tried to find an acceptable explanation for the disappearance.
Some events of the day provide interesting insights and a different perspective
into what may have taken place on the afternoon that Flight 19 disappeared:
Flight 19 was Lieutenant Taylor’s first assignment at Fort Lauderdale NAS. He
had been transferred from Miami in November, but he had led no navigation hops
in the area until he took command of Flight 19. Could Taylor’s lack of aviation
experience in the Fort Lauderdale area have played a part in the tragedy?
What about Lieutenant Taylor’s mental state? Why didn’t Taylor want to command
the mission? One observance, made by Allen Kosner, was that Taylor had been
reading a letter of some sort immediately prior to his assumption of command for
Flight 19. No one knows what the letter said; he simply slipped it into his
pocket, then made the cryptic remark: “I just don’t want to take this one out.”
What was the significance of this and how did it affect his judgment?
All of the equipment on each of the TBM Avenger torpedo bombers passed their
preflight inspections so, why, after only a short time in the air did both of
the compasses in Lt. Taylor’s aircraft fail? If both compasses did indeed fail,
as Lt. Taylor believed, why didn’t one of the other aircraft in the squadron
guide the mission? Did all of the navigational equipment in each of the planes
fail? Was this equipment failure a result of an electromagnetic anomaly in the
area as some researchers theorize?
Additionally, to be considered is the subject of weather. While in flight Taylor
was compensating for winds between 30 to 40 mph, which were the estimates on the
weather charts at Ft. Lauderdale NAS. Because of the sudden, infrequent weather
anomalies that tend to appear in the Bermuda Triangle area Taylor was probably
facing a more realistic estimate of upper level atmospheric wind disturbances
approaching the 90 mph range, which means that both of Taylor’s compasses were
working properly; he simply underestimated the strong headwinds. This
underestimation in wind speed would have caused a timing error on Taylor’s part
– he would have turned onto the third leg of the training mission too early.
While Lieutenant Taylor was lost somewhere over the Atlantic that afternoon,
Lieutenant Cox was instructing another group of students, Flight 18, on the same
mission as Taylor – Navigation Problem Number One. Lieutenant Cox and his crew
departed at 1:45 – less than half-an-hour before Taylor. Both Flight 18 and
Flight 19 departed from Ft. Lauderdale NAS, and, although Cox and his students
experienced problems with their radio reception Flight 18 completed Navigation
Problem Number One without incident.
On the subject of communication issues, there had been intermittent
communication problems between air traffic control towers and aircraft
throughout the day, but perhaps the most critical of these was the failure of
the Air Sea Rescue / Gulf Sea Frontier teletype system from 3:27 p.m. to 9:08
pm. All aviation facilities in the area were forced to use telephones for
seeking or dispersing information and congested telecommunication lines hindered
the exchange of information during that critical period.
Other incidents to be considered was the explosion of PBM Mariner Bu. No. 59225
which was due, most likely, to a crew member smoking a cigarette while in
flight. The PBM Mariner aircraft were nicknamed “flying gas cans” because of the
large amount of fuel they carried in order to complete search and rescue
missions. Also, a PBY Catalina search plane that was investigating the
single-bearing fix area obtained from Flight 19 suffered complete radio failure
when its antenna iced up and communications were lost.
In this line of thought, some have asked about the radar at Ft. Lauderdale NAS
and why it was not used to locate Flight 19. The most simple, basic and honest
answer is that all the radar equipment at Ft. Lauderdale NAS was intended for
training use only and was limited in its range to the immediate vicinity, making
it of no value for off-shore operations.
What about the emergency devices that all TBM Avenger aircraft came equipped
with? No one can explain why Taylor or any of the other pilots failed to use
their homing devices, which could have guided them to the air station. The base
transmitter was working all afternoon, and each TBM had a receiver.
And the emergency radio channels? Again, no one can explain why Taylor refused
to change his radio to 3,000 kilocycles – the channel reserved specifically for
aeronautical emergencies. Taylor told Cox, during their limited communications,
that he needed to concentrate on keeping his planes together. This was both an
illogical excuse and obviously poor judgment, especially for a veteran pilot.
Epilogue
In 1986, the wreckage of a TBM Avenger was found off the Florida coast when
crews were searching for debris from the wreckage of the Space Shuttle
Challenger. Four years after the discovery, in 1990, aviation archaeologist Jon
Myer raised the wreck of the aircraft from the ocean floor – he had become
convinced it was one of the missing planes from Flight 19 but positive
identification on the aircraft could not be made. During the course of the next
year the wreckage of five TBM Avengers was discovered off the Florida coast but
engine serial numbers revealed they were not from Flight 19. Each of those
planes – all within a mile and a half of each other – had crashed at different
times. The search for Flight 19 was made more difficult when NAS records
revealed that between 1942 and 1946 there were 94 aviation training accidents
involving the loss of personnel and aircraft in the area.
So, what really happened to Flight 19? Theories and speculation have been
rampant through the years, ranging from the factual to the fictional. With ideas
running through a wide spectrum of thought there are six theories that are the
most popular. Numerous would-be Triangle researchers have expounded upon these
ideas in connection with the fate of Flight 19, each with their own unique
conclusions.
Alien Theories: Some researchers believe that the men of Flight 19 were the
victims of alien abduction or that they were shot down by aliens while on their
training mission.
Chronos Theories: Others believe that Flight 19 flew into some sort of
dimensional warp, time slip, rift, vortex or wormhole from which they were
unable to get out of.
Human Error: Errors in judgment for fuel, route, time, environmnental
conditions, direction and / or distance may have contributed to the ultimate
loss of the aircraft and personnel on board.
Mechanical Theories: Equipment, structural or mechanical failure could have
potentially caused the aircraft to crash into the Atlantic during the routine
training flight.
Military Theories: While on their training mission Flight 19 was ambushed by a
German submarine(s) and shot down.
Weather Theories: Anomalous weather occurrences such as lightning, waterspouts,
microbursts, gaseous clouds / nitrogen bubbles from thermal vents on the ocean
floor and geoelectric / geomagnetic / electromagnetic fields and other weather
anomalies have all been blamed for the disappearance of Flight 19.
What’s the real ending to the story? Does the answer lie in one of the above
theories or in some combination thereof? Well, that’s the problem – the end of
this story has yet to be written. We may never truly know just what happened
during that afternoon on December 5, 1945 but until some sort of irrefutable
closure is reached the mystery of Flight 19 – and that of the Bermuda Triangle –
will endure in a perfect storm, clouded in the mystery of time and circumstance.
Bibliography & Research Resources
Lawrence, David K., Bermuda Triangle Mystery – Solved, pp. 97 – 122
Readers Digest, Mysteries of the Unexplained, pp. 131
